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Performance information in politics: How framing, format, 
and rhetoric matter to politicians’ preferences 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Performance information research has grown rapidly over the last decade with much 
research emphasizing the importance of how information is framed, presented, and 
communicated by using a distinct rhetorical appeal. In this study, we examine how the 
framing, format, and rhetoric of performance information influence preferences among 
elected politicians. We study the direct effects of how information is presented. We also 
argue that performance information is always a mixture of different frames, formats, and 
rhetorical appeals and that it is therefore important to account for interaction effects. 
Using a large-scale survey experiment with responses from 1,406 Italian local politicians, 
we find that framing and ethos-based rhetoric affect politicians’ responses to performance 
information. We also find that the format of presentation is important in several ways. 
Thus, politicians are more likely to support the status quo when information is presented 
graphically rather than textually, and a graphical format furthermore reduces the impact 
of ethos-based rhetoric and – to a lesser extent – the impact of equivalence framing. 
 
Keywords: Performance information, Framing, Information formats, Rhetoric, Political 
preferences 
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Performance information is a valuable means to increase the capacity of political 
decision-makers to make informed decisions (Moynihan 2008, p. 6; Van Dooren & Van 
de Walle, 2008; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008, p. 222). Without some valid and reliable 
information about performance, attempts to improve public service provision will likely 
be futile. However, we know from the literature on framing effects in public opinion 
(e.g., Druckman, 2001; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele, 1999; Klar, Robison & 
Druckman, 2013; Lau, Smith & Fiske, 1991, p. 645; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998), 
rhetoric (e.g. Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990; Herrick, 2001), and presentation formats in 
applied cognitive psychology (e.g., Tait, Voepel-Lewis, Zikmund-Fisher & Fagerlinthe, 
2010; Hollands & Spence, 1998; Simkin & Hastie, 1987; Lipkus & Hollands, 1999) that 
the ways information is presented have pivotal implications for how it is interpreted and 
understood. In practice, performance information will necessarily be framed in one way 
or another, presented in a particular format, and marked with rhetorical appeals when it is 
conveyed to political decision-makers. Thus, we know from the literature that 
performance information is indispensable in political systems, but it is also very unlikely 
that performance information can be transmitted neutrally to political decision-makers.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine how the presentation of performance information 
influences elected politicians’ preferences. Empirical studies of the literature on framing, 
format, and rhetoric are largely based on samples drawn outside political systems (see 
e.g., Druckman, 2001; Tait et al., 2010). They also tend to examine the explanatory 
factors in isolation although bias in the interpretation of performance information in 
political systems will always be likely to be a product of a mixture of framing, rhetoric, 
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and format. We also argue that interaction effects are relevant. We study actual political 
decision-makers (rather than random samples of citizens) and examine (in a large-n 3 x 4 
x 2 survey experimental design) how framing, rhetoric, and format interact when 
information is presented. The results show that framing of performance information has a 
strong effect on politicians’ preferences, and so have rhetoric and presentation format, 
although to a lesser extent, and, finally, they show that presentation format seems to 
moderate the effect of framing.  
 
This study is valuable for at least two reasons: firstly, it provides some insight into how 
complex decision-making processes unfold in real public sector settings, and secondly, it 
is useful for an architect of performance information to know which combination of 
framing, rhetoric, and format has the greatest impact on the recipients. The following 
section provides the theoretical backdrop by reviewing work on information framing, 
rhetoric, and format. We then present design and data. The next section reports the 
results, and finally, we discuss the results and conclude. 
 
Framing, Rhetoric, and Format 
Framing effects are relevant to performance information because the same piece of 
information may be presented in different ways without changing its content. This can 
apply to performance information, such as data on citizen satisfaction, compliance with 
quality standards, percentages of completion of public projects, target attainments, 
survival rates, and pass rates in school examinations. An equivalence framing effect 
occurs when individuals respond in systematically different ways to objectively 
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equivalent pieces of information that are framed differently (Levin et al., 1998; Rabin, 
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986). Several studies in different fields show that 
describing situations in terms of success instead of failure rates affects evaluations and 
decisions as positive framing leads to more favorable evaluations than negative framing 
(Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998). The underlying reason is that individuals encode 
information efficiently, and they do so by interpreting the information according to its 
descriptive valence (Levin & Gaeth, 1988), i.e., a positive framing leads to an encoding 
of the information, which tends to evoke favorable associations, whereas a negative 
labeling of the same information tends to evoke unfavorable associations. Along these 
lines, a growing literature suggests that negativity bias exists in the use of performance 
information (Boyne, James, John & Petrowsky, 2009; Charbonneau & Bellavance, 2012; 
Craig, Imberman & Purdue, 2015; James & John, 2007; Marvel, 2016). For example, 
Olsen (2015) shows that citizens' views of public service is affected by whether 
performance information is presented in terms of success rather than failure. Nielsen and 
Moynihan (2017) offer evidence of a negativity bias toward how elected officials use 
performance data to make a judgment about leadership responsibility. Indeed, they 
demonstrate that the provision of performance data on elected officials who show low 
performance encourages greater responsibility attribution to bureaucratic leaders. In line 
with these results, we expect that the framing of information matters to how the 
information is interpreted by political decision-makers.  
 
In addition to framing, information can also be transmitted by using different rhetorical 
appeals. Rhetoric is a classic discipline dating back to Aristotle, who distinguished 
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between three modes of persuasion: pathos, logos, and ethos. These three rhetorical 
appeals trigger different reactions (Bizzell & Herzberg, 1990; Herrick, 2001). Pathos 
appeals to affect emotions and aims to trigger immediate reactions. This type of rhetoric 
is associated with highly passionate appeals, and it is used, for example, to justify a 
particular course of action based on an audience’s sense of greed, fear, or happiness. 
Reactions following a pathos appeal are likely to fade out quickly if they are not 
adequately reinforced (Green, 2004). Unlike pathos, logos appeals to the rational side of 
the mind, which calls for rationales associated with ideas such as efficiency or 
effectiveness. Thus, logos appeals are described as being less immediate compared with 
pathos, but their persuasive effect is sustained over a longer period of time (Green, 2004). 
Finally, ethos justifications influence moral or ethical sensibilities, and refer to sacrificing 
self-interests for social and collective ones (e.g., honor or responsibility). Hence, ethos 
may have a slower persuasive effect than pathos and logos. However, once an ethos-
based practice is adopted, moral legitimacy is produced, and thus the persistence of the 
ethos appeals may become institutionalized (Green, 2004). In light of these 
considerations, it may be expected that transmitting information using rhetoric appeals 
affects how politicians interpret the information.  
 
Finally, information can be presented in different formats. In particular, the literature on 
presentation format has focused on whether data are supplied in a graphical or textual 
format. Graphs have been shown to promote better understanding of messages and 
information compared with textual formats in general, particularly among innumerate 
individuals (Tait et al., 2010; Hollands & Spence, 1998; Simkin & Hastie, 1987; Lipkus 
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& Hollands, 1999). Graphical reports have been found to improve judgement accuracy, 
both as supplements to and substitutes for traditional textual and numerical reports 
(Burkell, 2004; Feldman-Stewart, Brundage & Zotov, 2007; Peters et al., 2007; Waters, 
Weinstein, Colditz & Emmons, 2006). The geometrical aspects of graphical elements, 
such as position and size, are presumed to influence assimilation of data by the user. This 
does not imply that the presentation format has a direct effect on preferences. It rather 
implies that the presentation format can influence how strongly politicians react to 
framing and rhetoric. In other words, the presentation format is likely to interact with the 
two other aspects of how information is presented. We now turn to a discussion of these 
interaction effects. 
 
We consider three sets of interactions: first, the interaction between presentation format 
and framing, then between presentation format and rhetoric, and finally between framing 
and rhetoric. In practical terms, it is highly relevant to understand such interaction effects 
since, when performance information is presented to political decision-makers, framing, 
format, and rhetoric always appear in combination. 
 
As mentioned, presentation format affects the effort required to process and understand 
information, and framing affects preferences because the processing of information 
requires effort. To process information quickly, individuals rely on cues, such as negative 
or positive words. Using such cues, the information is seen as more critical when it is 
framed negatively than when the same information is framed positively. The graphical 
format reduces the effort required to process the information. Since the required effort is 
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smaller, individuals are less likely to use cues when they interpret the information. In 
other words, since the graphical format eases cognitive processing, we suggest that 
compared to a textual format, a graphical format reduces the impact of framing effects.  
 
Similarly, presentation format is likely to interact with rhetoric. Rhetorical appeals work 
in a way similar to framing. Cognitively demanding information processing leads to cue-
taking, which implies that individuals can be affected by rhetorical appeals. However, if 
the information is easy to process, the effect is likely to be dampened. Hence, we argue 
that the effect of rhetoric is likely to be smaller when the information is presented 
graphically.  
 
Finally, framing and rhetoric are also likely to interact. If logos leads to a more careful 
consideration of the content of performance information, framing effects are likely to be 
reduced. Conversely, if pathos produces an immediate response, and if ethos triggers 
moral considerations, framing effects are likely to be higher. Hence, we suggest that the 
effects of framing are stronger if a pathos- or ethos-based rhetoric is used and that the 
effects of framing are weaker if a logos-based rhetoric is used. 
 
In the following, we first present our research design in which we randomly assign 
vignettes with 24 combinations of framing, rhetoric, and framing to a sample of 1,406 
politicians from Italian local governments. We analyze main effects and interaction 
effects of framing, rhetoric, and format. We end by discussing the implications for the 
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literature on performance information, for the design of performance information 
systems, and for future research. 
 
Design and Data 
The present study aims to explore the effect of performance information on elected 
politicians’ preferences. To do so, the study presents the results of a large-scale survey 
experiment, which uses Italian local politicians as respondents. A survey experiment 
design has been chosen because it allows us to address possible concerns of endogeneity 
(e.g., Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2018; George, Desmidt, Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2017; 
Olsen, 2015). The Italian context constitutes an interesting testing ground as Italian local 
politicians have not previously been exposed to surveys and experiments, which focus on 
the use of and responses to performance information. Email addresses of the politicians 
have been collected from municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and 
supplemented with email addresses of those municipalities with less than 10,000 
inhabitants, which had the addresses available on public databases. The online survey has 
been sent to 17,400 local politicians and 1,406 have answered. The email invitation 
specifically stated that the email came from our research institution and that the survey 
results were for research use only. Also, the respondents were promised confidentiality in 
the sense that neither responses from individual respondents nor aggregate responses 
from municipalities would be identifiable in publications from the research. As shown in 
Table 1, the sample exhibits considerable diversity in terms of the politicians’ gender, 
age, and ideological position as well as the population size of their home municipalities.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Gender (female = 1) 0.305 0.461 0 1 1,400 
Age (years) 45 13 19 77 1,400 
Ideology 2.33 1.11 1 5 1,194 
Population size 56,223 131,617 446 1,242,123 1,406 
Notes: Ideology is measured on a five-point self-placement scale running from 1 (most to 
the left) to 5 (most to the right). 
 
To examine the independent and combined effects of rhetoric, format, and framing, the 
politicians were randomly assigned to one of 24 vignettes from the manipulation of those 
three factors. Following the literature on rhetoric, the councilors were exposed to either 
ethos, pathos, logos, or a neutral rhetoric. Furthermore, the information was either 
positively, negatively, or neutrally framed, and the format was either textual or graphical. 
We conducted the experiment in the context of school meals, which represent a salient 
issue in Italy. This allows us to test the direct effect of rhetoric, format, and framing as 
well as several interaction effects, and due to the multiple tests, the latter has an 
explorative element. 
 
The following paragraphs illustrate the structure and content of the 24 vignettes, resulting 
from the combination of the three factors: rhetoric (logos, pathos, ethos, neutral) X 
framing (negative, positive, neutral) X format (textual, graphical). For example, the 
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logos-based rhetoric has been designed to speak to the rational side of the mind by 
appealing to ideas of efficiency or effectiveness. As such, the textual format and positive 
framing read like this: 
 
“Please do your best to imagine yourself in the following scenario. A report that has 
recently been released by an independent agency shows that ninety percent of the 
meals served in the city schools meet the national quality standards. Based on the 
results presented in the report, the City Council will soon discuss a proposal aimed at 
improving the quality of the school lunch service, which will require allocating additional 
resources to the service. In particular, the proposal points out that the new solution will 
generate efficiency gains in terms of lower costs for waste management and for facing 
nutritional diseases.” In order to convey a pathos-based rhetoric by triggering an 
emotional reaction, the underlined in the text was replaced by “In particular, the proposal 
points out that the new solution will allow dealing with the increasing fears and 
complaints about food-related issues rising among parents’ associations.” The ethos-
based rhetoric was introduced by referring to potential consequences for health and 
environmental sustainability: “In particular, the proposal points out that the new solution 
will allow ensuring that children eat food that is healthier and ethically produced.” 
Finally, in the neutral group no rhetoric frame was included. Note that using different 
rhetorical styles involves highlighting different aspects of the information.  
 
The part in bold is the textual presentation of the information. In the graphical 
presentation, the respondents were shown the information in Figure 1 instead of the bold 
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text. Contrasting colors were used to increase the strength of the signal of the information 
provided. 
 
Figure 1 
Example of Graphical Format Vignette 
 
Panel A: Positive framing                Panel B: Negative framing 
 
 
 
Finally, the different framings (i.e., positive, negative, neutral) are reflected in the way 
the data on the share of meals, which satisfy national standards, are presented. In line 
with the literature (e.g., Blom-Hansen, Baekgaard, Christensen & Serritzlew, 2018; 
Olsen, 2015), we drew on an equivalence frame where identical information is either 
presented in a negative or a positive manner. Under the positive framing, respondents are 
informed that “ninety percent of the meals served in the city schools meet the national 
quality standards.” In the negative framing they are informed that “ten percent of the 
meals served in the city schools do not meet the national quality standards,” and in the 
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neutral frame is says that “ninety percent of the meals served in the city schools meet the 
national quality standards, while ten percent do not meet the standards.” The neutral 
frame thus provides both the positive and negative frames. The graphical vignettes vary 
the presentation of data as shown in Figure 1. Panel A shows the positive framing 
version, and Panel B shows the negative framing version as presented to the respondents, 
both translated from Italian to English. The text is identical with the text-based vignette 
shown above, except that the bold text is replaced by this text: “A report that has recently 
been released by an independent Agency, which has assessed the quality of the meals 
served in the City schools, shows the following results” as well as the circle diagrams 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
In accordance with previous research (Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015; Geys & Sørensen, 
2018; George et al., 2017), we focus on how performance information matters to 
politicians’ preferences for budget changes (what we call funding preferences). This 
allows us to discuss how politicians respond to information in order to avoid blame by, 
for instance, increasing funding in the event of negatively framed information. 
 
Following the performance information vignette, the politicians were thus asked to 
indicate their opinion on a policy proposal on school meals: “By using the slider below, 
please indicate the change in the school lunch fees that you would prefer. The change can 
vary from -5% (a fee reduction that will preclude any improvements of the school lunch 
service) to +10% (a fee increase that will cover all additional costs to improve the 
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service). Take into account that the school lunch fees are the only source of funding for 
the school lunch service.”  
 
Figure 2 
Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
 
Note: N=1,406. 
 
The respondents were required to indicate their answer on a continuous 16-point slider 
with one-percentage point intervals. This representation allows the respondents to answer 
in an intuitive way, and it allows us to see how the treatments affect how intensely the 
politicians react to the information provided. The resulting outcome is a continuous ratio 
variable, which is more informative than discrete or ordinal categorical variables, such as 
Likert scales. With an overall mean of 3.9 and a standard deviation of 3.3, there is 
15 
 
substantial variation in the responses, though, and as shown in Figure 2, we observe a 
tendency for responses to concentrate on focal values of either 0, 5, or 10. 
 
Results 
Figure 3 provides a first glimpse of our results. When information is presented in a 
textual format, the ethos-based rhetoric triggers the largest increase in preferences for 
funding, under both the positive and the negative frames. Another pattern that emerges is 
that preferences for increased funding tend to drop when moving from the negative to the 
positive frames, with pathos being the only exception. Notably, the pattern is much more 
blurred when looking at the results for the respondents who received the graphical 
format. This provides a first initial suggestion that presentation format matters to the 
impact of framing among political decision-makers. 
 
 
Figure 3 
Preferred Percentage Point Changes Presented by Experimental Treatment 
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Table 2 examines the combined impact of framing and information format on funding 
preferences. Model 1 shows the results of a baseline regression in which the main effects 
of the experimental treatments are explored. We find that respondents prefer more 
funding when performance information is framed negatively, possibly because negatively 
framed information generates a greater desire to spend more to avoid blame (see Nielsen 
& Baekgaard, 2015; George et al., 2017 for a similar interpretation). The average 
preferred change in funding under the negative frame condition is 4.5 compared to 3.8 
and 3.6 in the neutral and positive versions respectively. Thus, the difference between the 
positive and negative frames amounts to about one fourth of a standard deviation of the 
dependent variable. The finding that only negatively framed information has an impact is 
much in line with the literature on negativity bias. 
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Table 2 
The Impact of Equivalence Framing, Rhetoric, and Information Format on 
Preferences 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Equivalence framing     
Positive framing -0.187 (0.218) -0.187 (0.219) -0.481 (0.303) -0.268 (0.453) 
Negative framing 0.739 (0.207)** 0.742 (0.206)** 0.599 (0.282)* 0.865 (0.426)* 
Neutral framing (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
Rhetoric     
Ethos 0.595 (0.248)* 1.107 (0.338)** 0.593 (0.248)* 0.793 (0.425) 
Pathos -0.137 (0.249) -0.148 (0.349) -0.138 (0.249) 0.126 (0.421) 
Logos 0.358 (0.247) 0.628 (0.343) 0.360 (0.247) -0.043 (0.438) 
Neutral (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
Information format     
Graphical format -0.355 (0.173)* 0.032 (0.359) -0.646 (0.302) -0.353 (0.174)* 
Textual format (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
Interactions     
Ethos X graphical  -1.040 (0.496)*   
Pathos X graphical  0.035 (0.498)   
Logos X graphical  -0.534 (0.494)   
Positive framing X 
graphical 
  0.596 (0.437)  
Negative framing X 
graphical 
  0.286 (0.414)  
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Positive framing X ethos    -0.173 (0.630) 
Negative framing X ethos    -0.410 (0.585) 
Positive framing X pathos    -0.032 (0.625) 
Negative framing X pathos    -0.752 (0.590) 
Positive framing X logos    0.539 (0.624) 
Negative framing X logos    0.686 (0.595) 
Constant 3.717 (0.232)** 3.519 (0.281)** 3.859 (0.262)** 3.696 (0.318)** 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from an ordinary least squares 
regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.001, *p<0.01,  p<0.05. 
 
Moreover, the ethos-based frames turn out to have a positive impact on funding 
preferences, whereas neither the logos- nor the pathos-based frames have any influence. 
Compared to the equivalence framing, the effect of rhetoric is weaker in substantial 
terms. Finally, the politicians tend to prefer less funding when performance information 
is presented graphically, possibly because the graphical representation makes it more 
apparent that a very large percentage of the meals served in the city schools already meet 
the national quality standards, thus moving attitudes towards status quo. This 
interpretation is supported by descriptive statistics, since 20.1% of the respondents prefer 
the status quo in the graphical representation compared to 14.2% in the textual format.1 
However, the effect in this case is modest in substantial terms as it amounts only to 
approximately one tenth of a standard deviation. 
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Model 2 examines if the effects of the rhetorical appeals depend on whether the 
performance information is presented graphically or textually. The proposition is 
supported if the interaction term between the ethos-based frame and the information 
format dummies is statistically significant. As evident in model 2, this is exactly what we 
find. Since the interaction term between the ethos-based frame and the information 
format dummy is statistically significant and takes the opposite sign of the ethos-based 
main effect, and since the two coefficients are of almost similar size, the findings suggest 
that ethos-based framing can be inhibited by presenting the information in a graphical 
format. Given that our tests produce a total of 35 estimates in Table 2, with an alpha level 
of 0.05, we should observe on average 1.7 significant effects as a result of type I-errors. 
While we observe ten significant effects, it is impossible to rule out that some of them are 
due to type I-errors. Hence, this part of the analyses has an explorative element. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the three rhetorical appeals separately for the two 
information formats (i.e., textual and graphical). None of them causes any significant 
effects – relative to the neutral version – when a graphical format is used. In contrast, 
under a textual format, the ethos-based rhetoric triggers increased preferences for funding 
relative to both pathos and the neutral appeal. Also, when information is presented as a 
text, the logos-based rhetoric has a positive impact compared to both pathos and the 
neutral appeal, though only at the 0.1-level for the latter.  
 
Figure 4 
The Impact of Rhetorical Appeals by Information Format 
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Notes: The figure presents estimated effect sizes of rhetorical appeals (relative to 
neutral). 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Model 3 in Table 2 tests the extent to which the effects of equivalence framing is 
moderated by the format of the performance information. While the effects of negative 
framing are positive and almost of the same size for both information formats, the results 
are somewhat different for the positive framing. This treatment has an effect very close to 
zero when the graphical format is used, whereas it is negative and very close to being 
significant at the 0.05-level when the textual format is used. The difference between the 
positive and negative frames are also somewhat larger (though not significantly so) in the 
textual than in the graphical format (1.09 versus 0.76) (see also Figure 5). Thus, there are 
some indications that equivalence framing matters less in the textual than in the graphical 
format. The findings are not strong with respect to this conclusion, however. 
 
Ethos
Pathos
Logos
Ethos
Pathos
Logos
 Graphical format
 Textual format
-2 -1 0 1 2
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Figure 5 
The Impact of Equivalence Framing by Information Format 
 
Notes: The figure presents estimated effect sizes of equivalency framing (relative to the 
neutral framing). 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Finally, model 4 in Table 2 tests the combined impact of equivalence framing and various 
forms of rhetorical appeals. All interaction terms are clearly statistically insignificant, and 
thus the findings lend support to the interpretation that equivalence framing has generic 
effects regardless of the rhetorical appeal used in the presentation of performance 
information. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Knowledge about the effects and performance of policies and public organizations is vital 
for political decision-makers. An amblyopic political system cannot effectively address 
Positive framing
Negative framing
Positive framing
Negative framing
 Graphical format
 Textual format
-2 -1 0 1 2
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real world problems. This is why it is crucial to understand how performance information 
is processed and understood by political decision-makers. We know from the established 
literature on framing effects in public opinion, presentation format in applied cognitive 
psychology, and rhetoric that the way information is presented is decisive for how it is 
understood. Consistent with this literature, the same piece of information will be 
processed and understood differently according to how it is framed, how it is presented, 
and with which rhetorical appeals it is conveyed to the receiver.  
 
We show that these insights are highly relevant to political systems. In line with prior 
evidence on negativity bias (Blom-Hansen et al., 2018), our survey of 1,406 elected 
politicians shows that negatively framed information has a large impact on funding 
preferences. We also show that information format has a considerable effect, whereas we 
only find weak evidence for the importance of rhetorical appeals in affecting political 
preferences.  
 
We argue that it is important to study the combined effects of these three aspects of how 
performance information is presented. The effects of framing and rhetoric, for instance, 
are likely to be moderated by presentation format. To understand how performance 
information is understood in political systems, the three aspects may also need to be 
considered together. Our findings show that these interaction effects can be remarkable. 
Presenting information graphically reduces the effect of the ethos-based rhetoric and 
possibly also the impact of logos, although this effect is not significant at the 0.05-level. 
It also tends to reduce the impact of equivalence framing, though insignificantly.2 One 
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potential explanation for these findings is that graphical information is easier to interpret 
for many people, and thus the actual content of the information matters more when the 
information is presented graphically while the framing of the information becomes less 
important. Due to the large number of tests of interaction effects, the findings should be 
interpreted with caution, however.  
 
Knowledge about these effects is important, both to design performance information 
systems that can reduce bias (graphical presentation formats seem promising) and to raise 
awareness of possible manipulation (see Blom-Hansen et al., 2018). This points to some 
limitations of the current study and interesting perspectives for future research. Firstly, 
we focus on how the presentation of information matters to funding preferences. 
However, previous research has demonstrated that effects of performance information on 
funding preferences generally differ from the effects on, for instance, preferences for 
governance-related forms (Geys & Sørensen, 2018) and citizen satisfaction (Baekgaard, 
2015). Thus, we advise future research to study how the presentation of information 
matters to for instance performance evaluations and other political responses. 
 
Secondly, among the treatments on rhetoric, only ethos produces significant effects. 
However, these treatments have never before been tested in the context of performance 
data. To establish more firmly if and how rhetoric matters to the interpretation of 
performance information, future research is well advised to apply a series of experiments 
with multiple measures of the three rhetorical appeals to test whether the measures evoke 
the expected responses. Another potential problem when studying rhetoric is that 
24 
 
different rhetorical appeals highlight different aspects of the information presented. This 
implies that in a simple experiment with only one treatment for each rhetorical appeal, it 
is difficult to separate the effect of the rhetorical appeal from the potential effect of the 
attribute of the highlighted information. Future studies can address this problem by 
testing the effect of different implementations of the rhetorical appeals. 
 
Thirdly, we examine only a subset of framing (negativity bias), presentation formats 
(graphical or textual), and rhetoric (pathos, ethos, and logos). Future research should 
investigate how other aspects of framing, format, and rhetoric as well as other ways of 
presenting information affect how politicians – and people at large – respond to 
performance information. 
 
Fourthly, as shown by previous studies, the interpretation of performance information is 
prone to prior values and beliefs of those who receive the information (e.g., Baekgaard et 
al., 2017; Christensen et al., 2018; James & Van Ryzin, 2017). Thus, future research 
should explore how behavioral aspects and the way information is presented interact. For 
instance, it would be interesting to study how extant behavioral aspects are of different 
importance depending on how the information is framed, formatted, and communicated 
rhetorically. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
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1. Differences in the extent to which a status quo response is provided is indeed what seems to be driving 
the difference between the graphical and textual representation. The difference in mean responses 
between the two representations is thus clearly statistically insignificant (p = 0.58; N = 1,165) if status 
quo responses are not included in the analysis. Also, the percentage point difference of 5.9 in the use 
of the status quo response is substantially larger than the difference in use of any other response 
category. The second largest is a 3.3 percentage point difference for the “five percentage points” 
increase category, which is preferred to a larger extent in the textual than the graphical representation. 
2. It is important to remember that the power of the study is quite limited (we test a total of 35 effects in 
Table 2 with 1,406 observations). This means that statistical insignificance cannot be taken as 
conclusive evidence of a lack of effect. 
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